In the
Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Pete C. Lagran
G.R. No. 147270 August 15, 2001
Ponente: Justice Puno
FACTS:
1.
On April 18, 1994,
Pete C. Lagran was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City of
three counts of violation of BP Blg. 22.
2.
He was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of 1 year for each ount and pay a fine of P125,000.000,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
3.
Lagran appealed the
decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals but was dismissed for failure to
file appellant’s brief. The decision became final and executory on August 6,
1997 and entry of judgment was made on March 5, 1998.
4.
Lagran filed the
instant petition for habeas corpus on March 19, 2001 and prayed for his
immediate release as he had allegedly completed the service of his sentence.
5.
Citing Art. 70 of the
RPC, Lagran argued that if the penalties or sentences emanated from one court
and one complaint, the accused shall serve them simultaneously.
6.
Lagran stated that he
has been incarcerated for two years and four days, counted from February 28,
2001 and thus, his detention in the New Bilibid prison is now without legal basis.
ISSUE/S:
1.
W/N Lagran’s
contention and interpretation of Art. 70 of the RPC is correct.
RULING: Petition
is DISMISSED.
RATIO DECIDENDI
· Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code allows simultaneous service of two
or more penalties only if the nature of the penalties so permit.
· The penalties that can be simultaneously served are: (1) perpetual absolute
disqualification, (2) perpetual special disqualification, (3) temporary
absolute disqualification, (4) temporary special disqualification, (5)
suspension, (6) destierro, (7) public censure, (8) fine and bond to keep the
peace, (9) civil interdiction, and (10) confiscation and payment of costs.
These penalties, except destierro, can be served simultaneously with
imprisonment.
· Where the accused is sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment, the
terms should be served successively.
· In the case at bar, Lagran was sentenced to suffer one-year imprisonment
for every count of the offense committed. The nature of the sentence does not
allow petitioner to serve all the prison terms simultaneously.
· Applying the rule on successive service of sentence, we find that
petitioner has not yet completed the service of his sentence as he commenced,
serving his sentence only on February 24, 1999. His prayer, therefore, for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has no basis.
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