GR No.
118305
February 12,
1998
Ponente: Justice
Martinez
FACTS:
Philippine
Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50M loan from Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation or AIDC (petitioner). The Executive Vice President of PBM, Alfredo
Ching, executed security agreements making himself jointly and severally
answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. When PBM failed to pay the loan, AIDC
filed a case for sum of money with the Court of First Instance (Pasig). The
court rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay
AIDC the principal amount of P50M with interests. Pending appeal and upon the
motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of execution. A notice of sheriff
sale on three of the conjugal properties of the respondent spouses was issued. The
private respondents filed a case of injunction against petitioners to enjoin
the auction sale alleging that the latter cannot enforce the judgment against
the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that the subject loan did not
redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. The court issued a
temporary restraining order to prevent the enforcement of the writ of
execution. AIDC then elevated the petition to the Court of Appeals which issued
a temporary restraining order enjoining the court from enforcing its order and
paved the way for the auction sale of the spouses Ching’s conjugal properties. Petitioners
aver that there is no need to prove that actual benefit redounded to the
benefit of the partnership.
ISSUE:
Whether or
not a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband
in favor of his employer is within the contemplation of Article 161 of the
Civil Code.
HOLDING/RATIONALE:
- No. The petitioner’s
claim regarding the benefits the spouses would reasonably anticipate are not
the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The benefits must
directly result from the loan, it cannot be a by-product or a spin-off of the
loan itself.
- In all
decisions involving accommodation contracts of the spouse, the Supreme Court
has held that there must be the requisite showing advantage which clearly
accrued to the welfare of the spouses.”
- The burden
of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. The
petition did not present any proof to this effect.
- The
property in dispute involves the family home, whereas the loan is a corporate
loan and not a personal one. Signing as a surety is not an exercise of an
industry or profession nor an act of administration for the benefit of the
family.
JUDGMENT:
- Petition
is DENIED for lack of merit.
FOR REVIEW PURPOSES: “What debts and obligations contracted by the
husband alone are considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership”
which are chargeable against the conjugal partnership?
We do not
agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the terms “redounded
to the benefit of” or “benefited from” on the one hand; and “for the benefit
of” on the other. They mean one and the same thing. Article 161(1) of the Civil
Code and Article 121(2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both use
the term “for the benefit of.” On the other hand, Article 122 of the Family
Code
provides
that “The payment of personal debts by the husband or the wife before or during
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as
they redounded to the benefit of the family.” As can be seen, the terms are
used interchangeably.
No comments:
Post a Comment