Lacson v. Diaz (1965)

LACSON (appellant) v. DIAZ (appellee)

GR No. L-19346

May 31, 1965

Ponente: Justice Barrera

FACTS:

Abelardo G. Diaz (respondent) was ordered by the Court of First Instance (Negros Occidental) by final decision to pay Soledad L. Lacson (petitioners) the sum of P97,532.93 with legal interest plus a sum equivalent to 25% of the total amount for attorney’s fees. On August 1, 1961 The Court issued a writ of execution and through the Sheriff, sent a notice to Diaz’s employer at TalisaySilay Milling Company to garnish one-third of his monthly salary and of any other properties belonging to him, to cover the total amount of P132,718.30. Diaz filed with the court a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that since the money-judgement arose out of a contract entered into by him during his first marriage, said judgment cannot be enforced against his salaries which form part of the conjugal properties of his second marriage. Petitioners opposed this motion and contends that remarriage is not a cause for extinction of obligations, the lower court, however, denied this motion for lack of merit. Diaz became a widower in 1951 and remarried in 1960. The writ of execution and notice of garnishment in this case were issued and implemented in 1961. Furthermore, Diaz cites Article 163 of the New Civil Code which states that the payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal partnership of a second marriage may be held liable for obligations personal to the husband before the said marriage was contracted.

RATIONALE

As a general rule, debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage as well as fines and pecuniary indemnities are not chargeable to the conjugal partnership. However, such obligations may be enforced against the conjugal assets if the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the New Civil Code have already been covered, and that the obligor has no exclusive property or if the same is insufficient. It is incumbent upon the one who invokes this provision or the creditor to show that the requisites for its applicability are obtaining. In this case, it has not been established that Diaz does not have exclusive properties or that the same are not adequate to satisfy Lacson’s claim.

JUDGMENT:

- The case is demanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.